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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1980 thousands of refugees have come to the United 
States seeking refuge from either economic l or political2 strife in 
their homelands. Quite often, refugees arrive "destitute and des-
perate, bereft the family ties or special skills that facilitate assimi-
lation."3 Traditionally, the United States has welcomed refugees, 
I E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 137 (1985). An economic refugee is one who flees 
his or her home to escape poverty. The U.S. government, in most instances, considers 
refugees from Haiti, EI Salvador, and other Third World countries to be economic refugees. 
2 [d. at 139. A political refugee is one who would face persecution if returned to his or 
her home country. The distinction between economic and political refugees is not always 
clear. 
3 !d. at 116. 
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this welcome being a source of great national pride.4 However, the 
days of the invisible border are over. Alarming growth in illegal 
immigration and the mass flow of refugees from world trouble spots 
such as Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador, and Afghanistan have sparked 
public debate on how America should treat illegal aliens as well as 
the new flow of refugees. 
The saga of refugees who flee to the United States is often a 
harrowing tale of danger. Upon arrival in the United States, all 
refugees are required to present themselves at a port of entry for 
processing. In the United States a port of entry is most often located 
at either an airport or a border patrol station.·5 At the port of entry 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS") will deter-
mine whether a refugee should be admitted or excluded from the 
United States. There are various grounds for refusing to admit a 
refugee. 6 The grounds range from physical or mental disorders to 
criminal activity and polygamy. Exclusion is particularly harsh on 
refugees who flee to the United States from countries where they 
suffer persecution. One of the thirty-three grounds for exclusion 
provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act7 (the "INA") is 
that aliens who lack proper entry documentation will be excluded.8 
In most instances, refugees do not have the proper entry documents 
and are immediately found excludable by the INS. 
Once the INS determines that a refugee is excludable, the 
refugee is usually detained pending an exclusion hearing before an 
immigration judge. If the judge finds the refugee excludable, the 
refugee may appeal the decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals9 (the "BIA"). The BIA's decision may be appealed to the 
federal courts. 10 The refugee who is denied permission to enter the 
United States must either pursue other means of entry or face 
immediate deportation. 
4Id. (Quoting from "Text of Reagan's Speech Accepting the Republicans' Nomination", THE 
NEW YORK TIMES,July 18, 1980, at 8). "Can we doubt that only a divine providence placed 
this land, this land of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people who yearn to breathe 
free? Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people of 
Southeast Asia, Cuba, and Haiti." 
58 C.F.R. § 100.4(c)(2)-(3) (1987). 
68 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)-(33). 
7 Immigration and Nationality Act Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
88 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20). 
98 C.F.R. § 236.7(a). 
10 8 U.S.C. § 1105a. 
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Under current law a refugee who claims he will be persecuted 
if returned to his home country can obtain relief in one of two 
ways. The refugee can seek discretionary asylum ll or mandatory 
withholding of deportation. 12 In order to be eligible for asylum an 
alien must establish a "well founded fear" of persecution in his 
home country.13 If his request for asylum is denied the refugee will 
be immediately deported back to his home country, unless he can 
obtain a Withholding of Deportation under section 243(h) of the 
INA. This is not likely because in order to be eligible for section 
243(h) relief a refugee must show a "clear probability" of persecu-
tion if deported. 14 
The question of what constitutes an entry into the United States 
is of great importance to refugees l5 who attempt to challenge the 
denial of their admission into the United States. An excludable alien 
is one who has not made an entry into the United States. On average 
over 100,000 aliens are refused visas and excluded from entering 
the United States each year. 16 
An excludable alien, although physically present in the United 
States, is considered to have been detained at the border. 17 This is 
the entry fiction, a legal fiction that an alien, although physically 
inside of the country, is treated as if he had not entered. IS The 
immigration laws make a distinction between those aliens who have 
"come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within 
the U.S. after an entry, irrespective of it's [sic] legality."19 Due to 
the entry fiction, illegal aliens are subject to a deportation hearing 
1'8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Asylum Procedures). 
12 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Withholding of Deportatation or Return). 
J3 8 U.S.C. § llOl(a)(42)(A). 
14 INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). 
15 This Note uses the term refugee or excludable refugee to refer to an alien who is 
fleeing persecution or fear of persecution in his or her homeland, and has been denied 
permission to enter the United States. An undocumented alien is one who has entered the 
United States illegally. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States." 8 U.S.c. § I 101 (a)(3). 
16 FUCHS, The Search For A Sound Immigration Policy: A Personal View, in CLAMOR AT THE 
GATES 41 (N. Glazer ed. 1985). 
17 Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985); see generally Jean v. Nelson, 
727 F.2d 957, 969 (2d Cir. 1984). 
I. The entry fiction, as applied, can be used to deny admission both to a returning 
resident alien, and to those who are seeking admission for the first time. 
1'1 Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); see also Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 
1484. ("Deportable aliens, on the other hand, have succeeded in either legally or illegally 
entering this country."). 
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and as a result are accorded more procedural and substantive rights 
than an excludable alien. "Excludable aliens have fewer rights than 
do deportable aliens, and those seeking initial admission to this 
country have the fewest of a11."20 
While there are legitimate reasons for making a distinction 
between certain classes of aliens,2l the entry fiction disproportion-
ately favors aliens who enter the United States illegally and punishes 
aliens who attempt to enter the United States by following routine 
immigration procedures. 
The disproportionate effect of the entry fiction encourages 
illegal entry into the United States. According to the Governmental 
Accounting Office, an illegal alien "has little chance of being located 
and deported."22 United States law prohibits illegal entry,23 but 
paradoxically encourages illegal entry by poor enforcement of im-
migration laws and by awarding illegal entrants more procedural 
and substantive rights than those seeking legal admission. The ques-
tion remains, "[s]hould aliens be allowed to sneak across the Rio 
Grande, or slip in unnoticed across the Canadian border, and then 
expect to benefit from the Constitution's many procedural safe-
guards?"24 Meanwhile, refugees fleeing war torn countries of the 
Middle East and Central America are denied admission and re-
turned to their homeland to face persecution or even death. It is 
this paradox that will be the focus of this Note. 
Initially, this Note will examine the history of the entry fiction, 
its purpose, and the parameters of entry under current immigration 
law. Next, it will briefly outline the plenary power of Congress over 
immigration. The Note will then examine and compare the differ-
ing treatment accorded illegal (deportable) aliens in a deportation 
hearing and excludable refugees in an exclusion hearing. In doing 
so, the Note will attempt to show how the definition of entry under 
current immigration law favors illegal aliens over refugees fleeing 
persecution. In addition, the Note will examine the procedures for 
asylum and withholding of deportation under current law. The 
20 Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 1484. 
21 The reasons for the "entry fiction" are considered in more detail infra at note 37 and 
accompanying text. 
22 E. HULL, supra note I at 80. (citing from John M. Crewdson, New Administration and 
Congress Face Major Immigration Decisions, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Dec 28, 1980, at I, 120). 
23 8 U.S.C. § 12SI(a)(2) provides that "[a]ny alien (including an alien crewman) shall, 
upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who entered the United States without 
inspection or at anytime or place other than as designated by the Attorney General ... " 
24 E. HULL, supra note I, at 110. 
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Note will briefly review the historical backdrop of the immigration 
of refugees into the United States, and then discuss the standard 
of persecution a refugee must establish for relief under the provi-
sions of the Refugee Act of 1980.25 Also, the Note will review the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198626 (the "IRCA") and 
show how the IRCA reinforces the argument that the entry fiction 
has a disproportionate effect on refugees. In conclusion, the Note 
will propose and advance arguments supporting a change in the 
current definition of entry, so that an illegal entry will be considered 
as no entry at all. The result of this proposal would be to treat 
illegal aliens in the same manner as excludable refugees, thereby 
eliminating the patent unfairness of the entry fiction under current 
immigration law. 
II. THE ENTRY FICTION 
A. What Constitutes an Entry Into the United States 
Whether an alien has made an entry into the United States is 
important in determining the constitutional status of an alien who 
mounts a challenge to the denial of his or her admission into the 
United States. An excludable alien, although physically present in 
the United States, is considered to have been detained at the border. 
On the other hand, a deportable alien has made an entry, regardless 
of its legality. An alien in a deportation hearing is entitled to more 
procedural and substantive rights than an alien in an exclusion 
hearing. 
1. Early History 
Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195227 there 
was no statutory definition of entry. As a result, courts struggled to 
define what constitutes an entry for immigration purposes. An early 
decision of the Supreme Court suggested that an alien who simply 
crossed the border makes an entry into the United States. 28 In 1933 
"Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.c., and in 22 U.s.C. § 2(01). 
'" Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.c.). 
27 Immigration and Nationality Act Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U .S.C). 
2H See Note, Jean v. Nelson: Expansion of the "Entry Doctrine" Fiction, 15 S.W. L. REV. 575, 
582 n.40 (1985) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1893)). 
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the Supreme Court defined entry as "any coming of an alien from 
a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be 
the first or any subsequent one."29 This definition formed the basis 
for the definition provided in the IN A. 
2. Current Law 
The INA defines entry as "any coming of an alien into the 
United States from a foreign port or place or from an outlying 
possession, whether voluntary or otherwise ... [p ]rovided, that no 
person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by 
deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process .... "30 
Judicial interpretations have further refined this definition. The 
mere physical presence of an alien within the United States does 
not constitute an entry for immigration purposes.31 For example, 
simply crossing the border or arriving at a port of entry does not 
constitute an entry where the alien is detained pending a formal 
request for admission. Rather, in order for there to be a valid entry 
the alien must be physically present and free from official re-
straint.32 This definition was expanded in Cheng v. I.N.S.33 The 
Cheng court defined entry as either crossing the territorial limits of 
the U.S. and being inspected and admitted by an immigration of-
ficer, or intentionally evading inspection coupled with freedom 
from official restraint. 34 This definition of entry was adopted by 
BIA in 1984.35 This current BIA definition entitles an alien who 
illegally entered the United States to a deportation hearing rather 
than an exclusion hearing. 36 
29 United States v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933). See also Comment, "Entry" As An 
Issue In Immigration Law, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (1983). 
30 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)(l3). 
31 See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (detainment at Ellis Island is not 
entry into the United States). 
32 See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954). 
33534 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1976). 
34Id. at 1019. 
35 Matter of Ching and Chen, Int. Dec. 2884 (B.l.A. 1984). 
36 See Matter of Pierre, 14 I & N Dec. 467 (B.LA. 1973) (Haitian refugees who remained 
on board vessel awaiting inspection have not made an entry); Matter of Ching and Chen, 
Int. Dec. 2884 (B. LA. 1984) (alien who was refused admission and subsequently escaped 
custody has made an entry); Matter of A, 9 I & N Dec. 356 (B.l.A. 1961) (Alien has made 
an entry where after being ordered detained aboard a ship, he escaped and remained at 
large for two years). Compare Matter of Lin, 18 I & N Dec. 219 (B.l.A. 1982) (Alien who 
escaped INS detention has not made an entry). 
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B. Reasons for the Entry Fiction 
The entry fiction must exist in order to allow the United States 
to handle the influx of aliens. The immigration laws attempt to 
balance the rights of aliens, who have no connection to the United 
States, with the interests of the United States in controlling the 
composition of its population. The United States has long been 
regarded as the promised land for the weak and oppressed of the 
world. However, it is inconceivable that the United States could 
accommodate all those who wish to enjoy its bounty. Consequently, 
a system of immigration controls must exist to admit some and 
exclude others. 
This system should operate in a fair and just manner. The 
immigration laws should strive to admit those who have a connec-
tion to this country or who possess some special skill or knowledge 
that is helpful to the United States. Furthermore, the immigration 
laws should provide a fair method by which the oppressed and 
persecuted can gain entrance to this country. For the most part, the 
entry fiction is a necessary and proper device for excluding certain 
aliens. However, it is unfair and unjust for this country to allow 
illegal aliens, who subvert the immigration laws, to receive more 
procedural and substantive protection than refugees who are fleeing 
persecution and presents themselves for legal admission. Such a 
process conflicts with the immigration system and undermines the 
intent of the Congress.37 
III. PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS OVER IMMIGRATION 
A. National Sovereignty 
The power to exclude or deport aliens is not explicitly granted 
to Congress by the Constitution.38 However, in the Chinese Exclusion 
Case,39 the Supreme Court for the first time held "[t]he power of 
exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign 
37 For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the 'entry fiction', see generally Martin, Due 
Process and the Treatment of Aliens, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 180-90 (1983). 
38 The Constitution makes scant reference to the power of the legislative or executive 
branch over immigration. Article I grants Congress power "[t]o regulate commerce with 
foreign nations" (§ 8, c1. 3), "[t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization", (Id. c1. 4), "[t]o 
define and punish" ... "offences against the law of Nations." (Id. c1. 10). 
39 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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powers delegated by the Constitution .... "40 Subsequent decisions 
by the Supreme Court reinforce this holding. In Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy,41 the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that 
certain immigration legislation was void as an unconstitutional del-
egation of power. The Court reasoned that "[t]he exclusion of aliens 
is a fundamental act of sovereignty ... " and thus the decision to 
admit or to exclude an alien may be lawfully placed with the Pres-
ident, who may in turn delegate the carrying out of this function 
to the Attorney Genera1.42 
At issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case43 was an act of Congress 
which prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the United 
States.44 The Supreme Court upheld the statute.45 The Court con-
cluded that the power of the government to exclude aliens is a 
fundamental right of national sovereignty, and if Congress decided 
to exclude Chinese persons, then such action was valid. 46 The Court 
reasoned that the power of Congress to exclude aliens was available 
"at anytime when, in judgment of the government, the interests of 
the country require it .... "47 
Similarly, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,48 the Supreme Court 
upheld the plenary power of Congress to deport aliens from the 
United States. In this case, three Chinese laborers failed to apply 
for a certificate of residence pursuant to an act of Congress.49 The 
petitioners were arrested and held for deportation proceedings. 50 
The Court, in affirming the dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus, 
reasoned that "[t]he power to exclude aliens and the power to expel 
them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are 
supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one 
and the same [sovereign] power. "51 
40 Id. at 609. 
41 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
42 Id. at 543. 
43 130 U.S. 581. 
44 Id. at 589. The Act prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the U.S. if they had 
departed before the Act was passed. The petitioners claimed that the act violated existing 
treaties between the U.S. and China. 
45 Id. at 609. 
41i Id. 
47 Id. 
48 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
49 Id. at 699. 
50 !d. at 704. 
5lId.at713. 
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The Fang Yue Ting holding was confirmed in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy,52 in which the Supreme Court upheld the deportation 
of a resident alien who had joined the communist party after he 
arrived in the United States. The Court stated that the power to 
deport is inherent in every sovereign nation:,'>3 "[s]uch is the tradi-
tional power of the nation over the alien and we leave the law on 
the subject as we find it.",'>4 In addition to excluding aliens based on 
race,55 the Supreme Court has in recent years upheld the power of 
Congress to exclude aliens on the basis of political views56 and sexual 
preferenceY As a result Congress can set whatever terms it desires 
for the admission, exclusion and deportation of aliens. 58 This is true 
even if such criteria would be unconstitutional if applied to citizens 
of the United States.59 
While the source of the federal government's power over im-
migration may be attacked on a number of theories,60 it seems 
52 342 u.s. 580 (1952). 
53 U at 587-88. 
54 U at 588. 
55 See e,g" Lem Moon Sing v. U.S., 158 U.S, 538 (1895); Wong Wing v, U.S" 163 U.S. 
228 (1896). However, the power to exclude aliens on the basis of race was eliminated in 
1965,8 U.S.c. § 1152(a)(1976) provides that "[n]o person shall receive any preference or 
priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, 
sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence. , .. " 
56 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S, 753 (1972). Kleindienst involved a Marxian philoso-
pher (Mandel) who was denied admission pursuant to 8 U.S,c. § 1182(a)28(D), That section 
denies entry to those who advocate or publish "the economic, international, and governmental 
doctrines of world communism," American University professors brought suit, contending 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it denied them of "hearing and meeting with 
Mandel in person," 408 U.S, at 760, and as such violated their first amendment rights. The 
Court, relying on the plenary power of Congress and the limited review of the courts in such 
matters, disagreed, The Court held that when the Attorney General decides for a legitimate 
and bona fide reason to exclude aliens from entering the United States "the courts will 
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification 
against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the 
applicanL" [d, at 770, 
57 See Boutilier v. I.N .S., 387 U.s. 118 (1967) (the Supreme Court upheld the deportation 
of an excludable alien who was a homosexual). 
5H 338 U.S. at 609 (1889). See also Fong Vue Ting v, U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) ("It 
is an accepted maxim of International law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as 
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners 
within its dominion, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may 
see fit to prescribe.") (quoting Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 659). 
59 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable 
if applied to citizens."). 
60 See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
957,965-83 (1982). 
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certain that whether derived from the implied powers of the Con-
stitution or accepted principles of international law, the federal 
government's power over immigration is supreme. 
B. Limited Judicial Inquiry 
Judicial decisions hold consistently that "Congress has plenary 
power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude 
those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbid-
den."61 Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "over 
no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over [the admission of aliens to the country]."62 
Adding to the broad powers of the federal government is the "lim-
ited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation."63 Su-
preme Court cases "have long recognized the power to expel or 
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by 
the government's political departments largely immune from judi-
cial control."64 It is within this model of governmental power, rela-
tively free from judicial scrutiny, that the "entry fiction" operates 
to the disadvantage of excludable refugees. 
IV. EXCLUSION VERSUS DEPORTATION 
A. Comparison of Treatment 
If an immigration official determines that an alien has not made 
an entry into the United States, the alien will be detained pending 
an exclusion hearing. However, if the alien is found to have entered 
the United States, regardless of the legality of the entry, then he is 
subject to a deportation hearing. An alien in a deportation pro-
ceeding is entitled to significant procedural and substantive rights 
that are not available to excludable refugees. 
An alien in a deportation hearing may claim protection of the 
Fifth Amendment's due process clause.65 A deportable alien is con-
sidered to be within the borders of the United States and thus 
61 Boutilier, 387 u.s. at 123. 
62 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766. 
63 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792. 
61 Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)). 
65 The 5th Amendment provides that "no person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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entitled to constitutional protection.66 An excludable alien is consid-
ered a non-person for constitutional protection, because pursuant 
to the entry fiction, he is considered to have been detained at the 
border.67 An excludable alien is entitled only to the due process 
afforded by Congress.68 As Justice Murphy noted, in his concurring 
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon,69 the "Bill of Rights is futile authority 
for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores."7o 
Cases are legion holding that excludable aliens are not entitled to 
due process under the Fifth Amendment.7! 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in Landon v. Plasecia. 72 
The Landon Court noted that "an alien seeking initial admission to 
the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional 
rights regarding his application .... "73 Other cases suggest that 
some due process is due excludable aliens. 74 However, no court has 
awarded excludable aliens the same due process rights accorded to 
deportable aliens. Moreover, Landon can be distinguished from cases 
suggesting that excludable aliens have rights, as it deals with a 
returning resident alien, and not with an alien seeking admission 
for the first time. 
The INA provides excludable aliens minimal due process pro-
tections. Excludable aliens are entitled to a hearing before an im-
migration judge.75 At that hearing they are permitted to present 
evidence on their own behalf, to examine and object to evidence 
against them, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the gov-
ernment. 76 The aliens are permitted the assistance of counsel at the 
66 Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (The guarantees of the 14th Amendment 
extend to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.). 
67 Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 1484. 
68 Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544. 
69 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
7°Id. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
71 See e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953) (excludable aliens are 
not within the protection of the 5th Amendment). 
72 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
73 Id. at 32. 
74 Moret v. Karn, 746 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1984) (once procedural protections against 
termination of aliens' parole are in place, the INS' failure to follow its own directives is 
actionable); Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1987) (outside the context of admission 
and exclusion procedure, excludable aliens have some due process rights); Agustin v. Sava, 
735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984) (absence of adequate translation of political asylum proceedings 
denied procedural due process to excludable alien); Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 
877 (2d Cir. 1983) (in dicta, the court notes a refugee with a well founded fear of persecution 
may well enjoy some due process rights). 
75 8 U.S.c. § 1226(a). 
76 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a). 
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exclusion hearing. 77 They may appeal an order of exclusion to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals. 78 A final order of exclusion may be 
appealed by a writ of habeas corpus to the federal courts. 79 How-
ever, these protections pale in comparison to those enjoyed by an 
alien in a deportation hearing. 
Aliens who lose their right to reside in the United States 
through a deportation hearing are entitled to extensive substantive 
rights. In a deportation hearing for, example, illegal aliens may 
designate the country to which they prefer to be sent. 80 The INA 
provides that: 
[t]he deportation of an alien in the United States ... shall be 
directed by the Attorney General to a country promptly desig-
nated by the alien if that country is willing to accept him into 
its territory, unless the Attorney General in his discretion, con-
cludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to 
the interests of the United States.8l 
This relief is not available to excludable refugees. Excludable ref-
ugees are not in the United States within the meaning of the INA.82 
Excludable aliens are immediately deported. Deportation is to the 
country in which the alien boarded the vessel or aircraft on which 
he arrived in the United States.83 This is of special significance to 
alien-refugees who may face persecution if returned to their home-
land. Such a mandatory provision encourages refugees to make an 
illegal entry into the United States. 
Generally, a deportable alien cannot be detained for more than 
six months after an order of deportation. 84 The INA provides that 
once a final order of deportation is made against an alien, "[t]he 
Attorney General shall have a period of six months from the date 
of such order, or if judicial review is had, then from the date of the 
final order of the Court, within which to effect the alien's departure 
778 u.s.c. § 1362. The right to counsel is more a matter of form than substance. Most 
aliens cannot afford counsel. 
78 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). 
79 8 u.s.c. § II05a(b). 
80 8 U.S.c. § 1253(a). 
81 !d. 
82Id. The statute expressly provides that such relief is available to aliens who are "in the 
United States." The entry fiction provides that excludable aliens have not entered the United 
States but are considered to have been detained at the border. 
83 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a). 
84 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c). 
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from the United States .... "85 No statute prevents the detention of 
excludable aliens beyond six months.86 
An alien in a deportation hearing may appeal for one or more 
types of discretionary relief that are not available to the excludable 
refugee, including voluntary departure, suspension of deportation, 
and stay of deportation. In general, discretionary relief must be 
applied for during the deportation hearing.87 Such an application 
does not constitute a concession of deportability.88 As with most 
forms of discretionary relief, the burden is on the alien to show 
that he meets the statutory requirements.89 Moreover, even if the 
alien does meet this burden, the district director may still deny 
relief. 90 The district director will only be overruled if he abuses his 
discretion. Thus, a decision will only be overturned if the denial 
was made without "rational explanation," not in conformity with 
"established policies" or the decision rested on an "impermissible 
basis" such as discrimination.91 
A deportable alien may be entitled to voluntary departure.92 
The INA provides that: 
[t]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien 
under deportation proceeding ... to depart voluntarily from 
the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if 
such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral char-
acter for at least five years immediately preceding his application 
for voluntary departure under this subsection.93 
This type of relief is important for two reasons. First, voluntary 
departure enables the alien to select his or her own destination. 
Second, an alien who is granted voluntary departure is not consid-
ered to have been deported and thus that alien may re-apply for 
admission to the United States. 94 An alien who has been deported 
may not re-enter the United States for a period of five years. 95 An 
85Id. 
86 The prolonged detention of excludable aliens has received extensive legal and media 
attention. The detention of Marie! Cubans has spawned both law suits and riots. 
87 8 C.F.R. § 242.l7(e). 
88 [d. 
89Id. 
gil Patel v. I.N .5., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980). 
91 Wong Wing Hang v. I.N.S., 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966). 
92 8 U.S.c. § 1254(e). See also self-deportation 8 C.F.R. § 243.5. 
91 8 U.s.c. § 1254(e). 
94 8 C.F.R. § 243.5. 
95 [d. 
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excludable alien is not entitled to voluntary departure because the 
INA only refers to aliens who are in the United States. As a result, 
the alien will be returned to the country from where he came. 
Moreover, he will be considered deported and consequently will not 
be able to re-apply for admission for a period of five years. 
A deportable alien may be entitled to a Suspension of Depor-
tation.96 The INA provides that the "Attorney General may, in his 
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the [aliens] status to that 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence .... "97 In 
order to qualify for a suspension, the alien must (i) apply to the 
Attorney General for a suspension of deportation, (ii) show that he 
is deportable under any law of the United States, (iii) show that he 
has been physically present in the United States for a period of not 
less than seven years, (iv) prove that he was and is a person of good 
moral character, and (v) prove that his departure would result in 
"extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, 
who is a citizen .... "98 The purpose of this section is to protect 
those aliens who have been present in the United States for a long 
period of time from the harsh consequences of deportation. Once 
again such relief is not available to excludable refugees. 
In a deportation hearing the burden is on the government to 
show by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that the alien 
is deportable. 99 In an exclusion hearing the burden is on the alien 
to show that he is not subject to exclusion.lOo The only exception to 
this rule arises when the issue of illegal entry is involved. In such 
cases, the burden is on the alien to show he has not made an illegal 
entry. 101 However, not all illegal aliens have entered this country 
illegally. Many aliens have been properly admitted but have re-
mained in the United States after expiration of their entry permits 
or visas. Because there is no question of illegal entry, the burden is 
on the government to show by "clear, convincing, and unequivocal 
evidence"lo2 that an alien is deportable. 
In contrast, in an exclusion hearing the burden is on the alien 
to establish that he is "not subject to exclusion under any provision 
96 8 U.S.c. § 1254(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 244. 
97 8 U .S.C. § 1254(a). 
98 [d. 
998 C.F.R. § 242.14(a). See also Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). 
100 8 U.S.c.§ 1361. 
101 [d. Despite the word 'any' in the statute, section 1361 has been interpreted to apply 
only to a deportation hearing where illegal entry is an issue. See Iran v. I.N .S., 656 F.2d 469 
(9thCir.1981). 
102 Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286. 
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of this [the INA] Chapter .... "103 This is a heavy burden for a 
refugee to carry, and may prove virtually impossible in many cases. 
Refugees who arrive in the United States are in most instances 
without proper entry documentation. The INA expressly provides 
that aliens without proper entry documents are excludable. 104 
Therefore, excludable refugees must pursue other methods of ad-
mission, such as asylum, or face immediate deportation. !Os 
As the above discussion indicates, an alien in a deportation 
hearing receives more substantive and procedural rights than a 
refugee in an exclusion hearing. As a result, the immigration laws, 
by providing illegal aliens better treatment in a deportation hearing, 
encourage illegal entry. 
V. ASYLUM AND MANDATORY WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION 
A. Current Law 
Under current immigration law, an excludable refugee who 
claims he or she will be persecuted if deported can seek relief in 
two ways. First, under section 243(h) of the INA, the Attorney 
General is required to withhold deportation of an alien who dem-
onstrates that his or her "life or freedom would be threatened in 
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion."106 Second, the 
alien may seek discretionary asylum under the Refugee Act of 
1980.107 Section 208(b) of the INA provides that an alien may be 
granted asylum at the Attorney General's discretion, if the Attorney 
General determines that the alien is a refugee within the meaning 
of the INA. !Os A refugee is defined by the INA as "any person who 
is outside any country of such person's nationality" or is "unable or 
103 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
104 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(20). 
105 The discussion in the body of the Note regarding the differing treatment given to 
deportable versus excludable aliens is not exhaustive. There are other areas in which de-
portable aliens receive better treatment. Deportable aliens may appeal directly from the 
B.LA. to the federal courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a. An excludable alien may only appeal via habeas 
corpus relief. 8 U.S.C. § lI05(b). Moreover, in a deportation hearing the alien is entitled to 
seven days notice, whereas in an exclusion hearing there is no notice requirement. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 242.I(b). See In re Salazar 17 1. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (BIA 1 979)(notice given at an exclusion 
hearing is sufficient). 
IOn 8 U.S.c. § 1253(h). 
107 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-·212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C., and in 22 U.S.C. § 2601). 
lOB 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
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unwilling to return to or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion .... "109 
Accordingly, the burden is on the asylum applicant to establish that 
he or she has a well founded fear of persecution on account of any 
of the enumerated reasons. 
Application for asylum may be made either to the district di-
rector of the INS or, if exclusion or deportation hearings have 
begun, to the immigration judge. llo The district director may ap-
prove or deny the request for asylum at his or her discretion. I II 
Decisions by the district director are not subject to review. 112 In 
general, a request for asylum will be denied if, (a) an alien is not a 
refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Act; (b) the alien has 
been firmly resettled in a foreign country; (c) the alien assisted in 
the persecution of any other person; (d) the alien has been convicted 
of a serious crime; (e) the alien has committed serious non-political 
crime outside of the United States; or (f) the alien poses a danger 
to United States security.ll3 Decisions of the immigration judge may 
be appealed to the Board ofImmigration Appeals. 114 An excludable 
alien may appeal an order of the BIA to the federal courts by writ 
of habeas corpus. 115 If asylum is granted, it may be terminated if 
an alien is no longer a refugee within the meaning of the INA, or 
if circumstances change in the country in which the alien last re-
sided. 116 
B. Historical Backdrop 
1. Prior to 1968 
In order to have a better understanding of the problem of 
illegal immigration and asylum, a brief review of the treatment of 
refugees in the United States is necessary. Prior to 1968 there was 
limited legislation which authorized the Attorney General to with-
hold deportation of an otherwise deportable alien due to the fact 
109 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
110 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a)(b). 
III Id. 
112 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a). 
1\3 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(c). 
114 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f). 
115 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (b)( I). 
1\ 6 8 U.S.c. § l105a. 
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that the alien would be subject to persecution if returned to his 
native country.1I7 Section 243(h) of the INA provided relief only to 
those aliens who were within the United States after an entry re-
gardless of the legality of the entry.118 Before being amended by 
the Refugee Act of 1980, section 243(h) of the INA provided that 
"[t]he Attorney General is authorized to withold deportation of any 
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion 
the alien would be subject to physical persecution and for such 
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason."119 
Such relief was denied to aliens who were "at the border seeking 
refuge in the United States." 120 
U.S. policy toward refugees seeking asylum at the border was 
"reactive and ad hOc."121 In 1948, Congress passed the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948 (the "DPA").122 The purpose of the Displaced 
Persons Act was to deal with the flow of refugees from Europe 
following World War II.123 In 1952 Congress passed the INAI24 
which allowed for parole or temporary asylum of aliens at the 
discretion of the Attorney General. 125 The purpose of the INA was 
to provide for the admission of aliens under emergency circum-
stances. 126 This became the principal means by which refugees en-
tered the U.S. 127 The Attorney General was authorized under the 
INA to permit "conditional entry" to refugees fleeing a "communist-
dominated area or the Middle East" because of fear of persecu-
tion. 128 This represented an extreme shift in U.S. refugee policy 
because, for the first time, aliens who were from other areas were 
117 I.N.S. v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 414 n.5 (1984) (quoting the SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 
CONTROL ACT of 1950) "No alien shall be deported under any provision of this Act to any 
country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be· subjected to 
physical persecution." 
118 !d. at 414 n.7. This portion of the INA was amended in 1965 by eliminating "physical 
persecution" and inserting "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 
119 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). 
120 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 415. 
121 E. HULL, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting [H. Rep. No.] 608, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 6 
(1979) (testimony of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance) at 1,9). 
122 The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647; 62 Stat. 1009. 




127 [d. at 117-18. The Attorney General used this parole power to admit 38,000 Hun-
garians in 1956, 690,000 Cubans beginning in 1954, and 360,000 Indochinese between 1975 
and 1980. 
128 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 415. 
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officially excluded. 129 This led the President's Commission of Im-
migration and Nationality to conclude in 1952 that "[t]he United 
States is one of the few major democratic countries of the free world 
whose present laws impede and frequently prevent asylum."13o 
2. The United Nations Protocol 
In 1968 the U.S. became a party to the United Nation's Protocol 
("the Protocol") relating to the status of refugees. 131 The Protocol 
provides a definition of refugee132 and requires signatories133 to 
honor the principle of non-refoulment. The principle of non-re-
foulment prohibits the host state from returning a refugee to a 
country where the refugee would face persecution. 134 The Protocol 
was the forerunner to the Refugee Act of 1980. 
From 1968 until the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980 the 
BIA and most courts have consistently held that the standard a 
refugee must establish for relief is "clear probability" of persecu-
tion. 135 In In Re Dunar136 the BIA held that there is no substantial 
difference in coverage of section 243(h) of the INA (discretionary 
withholding of deportation) and Article 33 of the Protocol. 137 The 
court further concluded that "Article 33 of the Protocol has effected 
no substantial changes in the application of section 243(h) of the 
INA, either by way of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of 
arriving at decisions."138 
Similarly, in Kashani v. INS139 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in dismissing a petition for review, held that an alien 
129 E. HULL, supra note 1, at 117. 
130 [d. (quoting the Presidents' Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, " Whom 
We Shall Welcome" p. 118). 
131 United Nations Protocol Relating to The Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 
No. 6557 Jan 31, 1967. 
132 [d. at art. 1.2. The Protocol defines a refugee as a person who "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality, and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it." 
133 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 416 n.9. The United States is not a signatory to the Protocol. Nor 
did it adopt the Protocol definition of refugee until the Refugee Act of 1980. 
134 E. HULL, supra note 1, at 118. 
135 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 419 n.12. 
136 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 320 (BIA 1973). 
137 [d. 
138 [d. at 323. 
139 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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seeking to avoid deportation due to a "well founded fear of perse-
cution" must meet the same standard under the Protocol as under 
section 243(h) of the INA which allows the Attorney General to 
withhold deportation. 140 The court noted "the well founded fear 
standard contained in the Protocol and the clear probability stan-
dard which this court has engrafted onto Section 243(h) will in 
practice converge."141 
3. The Refugee Act of 1980 
In 1980 Congress passed the Refugee Act. 142 Under the Ref-
ugee Act the language of section 243(h) was amended to conform 
to Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol. l43 First, the amend-
ment to the INA changed the discretionary authority of the Attor-
ney General under the old section 243(h) to that of mandatory 
withholding of deportation. 144 Second, the Refugee Act required 
the Attorney General to determine that an alien's "life or freedom 
would be threatened" rather than that the alien "would be subject 
to persecution."145 Finally, the Refugee Act includes "nationality" 
and "membership in a particular social group" as causes of perse-
cution. 146 However, none of the changes explicitly changed the 
standard of proof (clear probability of persecution) that an alien 
must meet in order to be entitled to mandatory withholding under 
the amended version of section 243(h).147 
The amendments to the INA by the Refugee Act make no 
mention of "refugee" as does INA section 208(b)'s asylum provi-
sion. The original version of section 243(h) only referred to aliens 
who were "within" the United States as being entitled to withholding 
under the IN A.148 Prior to 1980 an excludable alien could not apply 
for relief under 243(h).149 Rather, such relief was only possible in a 
140 [d. 
141 [d. 
142 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.c., and in 22 U.s.C. § 2601). 
143 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 421. 
144 [d. at 421 n.IS. 
146 !d. 
147 [d. at 421. 
14R 8 U .S.C. § 12S3(h). 
149 [d. Before the INA was amended, section 243(h) read "any alien within the United 
States." After the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the amended version simply read "any 
alien." 
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deportation proceeding. An alien had to have made an entry, even 
an illegal entry, in order to be eligible under section 243(h).150 
C. Well Founded Fear versus Clear Probability of Persecution. 
There has been much debate over what standard of proof the 
alien must establish to be granted asylum under section 208(b).151 
It is generally accepted that under section 243(h) the alien must 
establish a "clear probability" of persecution to avoid deportation. 152 
However, what standard must be established under section 208(b) 
has been a subject of debate among the circuits. 
The reasons for this conflict center on the general understand-
ing that the "well founded fear" standard is more generous than 
the "clear probability" standard required under section 243(h).153 
The BIA 154 and the Third Circuit l55 agree that the standard to be 
established under either section 208(b) or section 243(h) are iden-
tical. In both cases, the plaintiff must show a clear probability of 
persecution in order to be entitled to relief. 
If the clear probability standard is a more difficult standard to 
meet than the well founded fear standard, an alien who cannot 
meet the clear probabilty standard will be denied both asylum and 
withholding of deportation. However, if the standards differ, aliens 
could establish a claim for asylum though they would be denied a 
withholding of deportation. Recently the Supreme Court decided 
this issue in I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 156 In Cardoza-Fonseca, the 
Court held that the "well founded fear" standard under section 
208(b)(asylum), was not the same as the "clear probability" of per-
secution under 243(h), which authorized mandatory withholding of 
deportation. 157 
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the respondent, a thirty eight year old Nic-
araguan, illegally entered the United States by overstaying her vis-
itor's permit. 15s The respondent declined the Immigration and N at-
150 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of entry. Illegal entry 
is a valid entry for immigration purposes pursuant to the entry fiction. 
151 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1210 (1987). 
152 Stevie, 467 U.S. at 419. 
153 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1210. 
154 !d. The BIA in the present case applied the same standard, (clear probability), to both 
the asylum and withholding of deportation claim. 
L" Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (3d Cir. 1985). 
156 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). 
157 !d. at 1209. 
158 [d. 
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uralization Services' offer of voluntary departure and as a result 
deportation proceedings were commenced against her. 159 Respon-
dent admitted that she was in the country illegally and instead 
sought asylum under section 208(b) of the Refugee Act and with-
holding of deportation under section 243(h) of the IN A.160 In order 
to support both of her requests, the respondent presented evidence 
that her brother had been tortured and imprisoned due to his 
political beliefs in Nicaragua. 161 Respondent contended that due to 
both her and her brother's opposition to the Sandinistas she would 
be tortured if forced to return. 162 
Respondent's requests for asylum and withholding of depor-
tation were denied by the Immigration Judge and by the BIA.163 
The Immigration Judge and the BIA considered the standards 
under sections 208(a) and 243(h) to be identical. 164 On appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit, the respondent claimed that both "the Immigra-
tion Judge and the BIA erred in applying the 'more likely than not' 
standard of proof from section 243(h) to her section 208(b) asylum 
claim."165 Rather, the respondent claimed they should have applied 
the "well founded fear" standard to her asylum claim. 166 This was 
based on respondent's belief that the well founded fear standard 
was more generous. 167 The Ninth Circuit agreed. 168 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 169 
The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that 
there is no difference between the "well founded fear" test and the 
"would be threatened" test of section 243(h).170 First, the language 
used by Congress in describing the two standards conveys different 
meanings. "[T]he 'would be threatened' language of section 243(h) 
has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to es-
tablish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he 












1711 fd. at 1212. 
171 fd. 

